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The Application of An Offer of Judgment
in a Title VII Suit
I. Introduction
In the federal courts, the results of a pre-trial offer of judg-
ment are governed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.' The Rule provides that if the offeree, usually the plain-
tiff, refuses an offer made by the offeror, usually the defendant,
and he continues with the suit and is granted a judgment less
favorable than the offer, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's
costs.
In Delta Air Lines, Inc., v. August,2 the Supreme Court
held that the Rule does not encompass a judgment against the
offeree.3 Therefore, Rule 68 is inapplicable when the plaintiff-
offeree loses completely.' Two problems arise from this decision:
First, the Court places a plaintiff who receives a partial judg-
ment in a worse financial position than a plaintiff who loses
1. Rule 68 Provides in relevant part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with
costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse
party serves written notice tbat the offer is accepted, either party may then fie
the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and there-
upon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed with-
drawn and evidence thereof is not admissable except in a proceeding to determine
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than
the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer
FED. H. Cv. P.68.
2. 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
3. Id. at 348 (emphasis in original).
4. Id. at 352. Previously, courts were willing to consider the application of Rule 68
even in situations where the plaintiff-offeree had received an adverse judgment. For ex-
ample, in Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 86 F.R.D. 500,
503-04 (N.D. Cal. 1980), a case involving a losing plaintiff, the court held that Rule 68
should not be applied. The basis of the decision was the policy of encouraging class ac-
tion suits alleging racial discrimination. See Dual v. Cleland 79 F.R.D. 696 (D.D.C. 1978),
a case also involving an adverse decision for the plaintiff, but where the court ordered
the plaintiff to pay defendant's costs, even though it was a Title VII action.
1
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completely; second, the decision will be difficult to apply when a
plaintiff is offered and rejects only monetary relief, but the court
awards only injunctive relief.
Part II of this note sets forth the legal background of the
case. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's decision and Part
IV analyzes the Court's reasoning. Part V contains the conclu-
sion that the Supreme Court approached the issue of a Rule 68
offer in a backward manner. Instead of first examining whether
an offer was made within the terms of the Rule, the Court
waited until the litigation was concluded to determine whether
the Rule applied to this situation. Although the applicability of
the Rule cannot be determined under either approach until the
final judgment, there should be some guidelines to determine
whether there was an initial bona fide offer sufficient to trigger
Rule 68 at the conclusion of litigation. The Supreme Court, in
effect, applies the Rule to untrue offers creating unfair results.
II. The Legal Background of the Case
In this case Rosemary August alleged that she had been
fired from her job as a flight attendant because of her racial ori-
gin.5 She sought "reinstatement, back pay, benefits, other equi-
table relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.... .' Delta Airlines
offered her "$450, including costs and attorneys' fees accrued to
date.. .- 7 Upon rejection of this offer by Ms. August, the case
proceeded to trial.
The district court held that 'Ms. August had failed to prove
racial discrimination. 8 Judgment was entered in favor of the de-
5. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699, 700 (7th Cir. 1979). Her claim was
based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)
which provides in part.
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin;...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
6. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d at 700.
7. Id.
8. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 78-2312 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision relating to the Title VII claim. August v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979).
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fendant, but each party was ordered to bear its own litigation
costs.9 Thereupon, the defendant filed a motion for costs in-
curred as of the date of the Rule 68 offer.10 The district court
denied the motion.11
The defendant on appeal argued that Rule 68 should be ap-
plied in this case because the Rule provides an incentive for set-
tlement of suits by depriving the judge of his Rule 54(d)"1 dis-
cretion to award costs. Once an offer of judgment is made a
losing plaintiff automatically would be denied the possibility of
an award of costs.
The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the $450 of-
fer was in bad faith since the plaintiff's alleged damages, includ-
ing attorneys' fees and costs, were over $20,000.13 The court
stated that allowing a defendant to make a minimal bad faith
offer to avoid paying costs would subvert the purpose of Rule
68. Although insufficient to meet the burden of proof for the
discrimination claim, the evidence demonstrated that there was
some racial bias and Ms. August's claim was not frivolous. 15 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, noting the important
social policies"' involved in Title VII cases, was also concerned
that awarding costs when the offer was nominal would discour-
age Title VII lawsuits.
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
9. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 78-2312 (N.D. I. 1979).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Rule 54(d) provides in relevant part- "[Ejxcept when express provision therefor
is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs,...." FaD. P. Civ.
P. 54(d).
13. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d at 701-02.
14. The Court stated:
[T]he Rule 68 offer of judgment of less than $500 before trial is not of such
significance in the context of this case to justify serious consideration by the
plaintiff ....
If that were so, a minimal Rule 68 offer made in bad faith could become a
routine practice by defendants seeking cheap insurance against costs. The useful
vitality of Rule 68 would be damaged.
Id. at 70L (footnote omitted).
15. Id.
16. In this context the court noted, "Title VII embodies a basic national policy
given a high priority by Congress .... We do not propose to permit a technical inter-
pretation of a procedural rule to chill the pursuit of that high objective." Id.
19821 333
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court of appeals solely on the basis that the question presented
by the defendant was not raised in the lower court and, there-
fore, was not properly before the Supreme Court.17 In the body
of the opinion it is abundantly clear, however, that the Supreme
Court would have reversed the court of appeals, if the issue had
been properly presented; the Court is specific in stating that
Rule 68 does not apply to situations similar to that of Ms. Au-
gust, where the plaintiff-offeree has a judgment entered against
him and in favor of the defendant-offeror.1 8 The Court reached
this decision based upon a plain language reading of the Rule
and upon consideration of the Rule's purpose and history.
Rule 68 is a coercive rule, intended "to encourage settle-
ment and avoid protracted litigation."191 Under it a party defend-
ing a claim may make an offer of judgment. If the other party
refuses and the final judgment is less favorable than the offer,
the offeree is liable for any costs accruing after the date of the
offer.20
Rule 68 has survived since its passage in 193821 with only
minor changes to the text, none affecting the part of the Rule
interpreted in August.2 While the idea behind the Rule was new
to federal practice when it was first proposed in 1937, it was not
a totally new concept. The advisory committee's notes to the
Rule cited to three state statutes as examples of the Rule's ap-
plication: Minnesota, Montana and New York.23 These statutes
17. The Court stated: "[Ajlthough defendant's petition for certiorari presented the
question of the district judge's abuse of discretion in denying defendants (sic) costs
under Rule 54(d), that question was not raised in the Court of Appeals and is not prop-
erly before us." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August. 450 U.S. at 362.
18. The Court remarked, "[i]t therefore is simply inapplicable to this case because it
was the defendant that obtained the judgment." Id. at 352.
19. 5 F.R.D. 433, 483 note (1946). See Report on the Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 483
note (1946); Maguire v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 9 F.R.D. 240 (W.D. La. 1949), af'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 181 F.2d 320, 320 (5th Cir. 1950); 7 J. MooRe,
MooRE's FEDmRAL PAcricz 68.02 (2d ed. 1980).
20. The relevant part of Rule 68 is: "If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the
making of the offer... ." FtD. R. Civ. P. 68.
21. Rule 68 was proposed in 1937, see 1 F.R.D. CXXXIV (1937), and enacted a year
later. 28 U.S.C. § 723c (1976).
22. See 5 F.R.D. 482-83(1946); 39 F.R.D. 126 (1966).
23. See Notes to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States, at 63 (March 1938) (citing 2 MInN. STAT. § 9323 (Mason 1927); 4 MONT. Rsv.
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imposed costs on a plaintiff who rejected a settlement offer and
then did not obtain a judgment more favorable than the offer."
This practice was also firmly established in equity courts prior
to the Federal Rule. 5 The rule in equity was that a party who
sues vexatiously may be denied costs after he has refused an of-
COD ANN. § 9770 (1935); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 177 (Cahill 1937)).
24. The texts of the three state statutes are set out below.
The Minnesota statute provides:
At least ten days before the term at which any civil action shall stand for the
trial the defendant may serve on the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
be taken against him for the sum, or property, or to the effect therein specified,
with costs then accrued. If within ten days thereafter such party shall give notice
that the offer is accepted, he may file the same with proof of such notice, and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. Otherwise the offer shall be
deemed withdrawn, and evidence thereof shall not be given; and if a more
favorable judgment be not recovered no costs shall be allowed, but those of the
defendant shall be taxed in his favor.
2 MmN. STAT. § 9323 (Mason 1927).
The Montana statute provides:
The defendant may, at any time before trial or judgment, serve upon the
plaintiff an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the sum or prop-
erty, or to the effect therein specified. If the plaintiff accept the offer, and give
notice thereof within five days, he may file the offer, with proof of notice of ac-
ceptance, and the clerk must thereupon enter judgment accordingly. If the notice
of acceptance be not given, the offer is to be deemed withdrawn, and cannot be
given in evidence upon the trial; and if the plaintiff fail to obtain a more favorable
judgment, he cannot recover costs, but he must pay the defendant's costs from the
time of the offer.
4 MoNT. RzV. CODP ANN. § 9770 (1935). The New York statute provides:
Before the trial, the defendant may serve upon the plaintiff's attorney a writ-
ten offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for a sum, or property, or to
the effect, therein specified, with costs. If there be two or more defendants, and
the action can be severed, a like offer may be made by one or more defendants
against whom a separate judgment may be taken. If the plaintiff, within ten days
thereafter, serve upon the defendant's attorney a written notice that he accepts
the offer, he may file the summons, complaint, and offer, with proof of acceptance,
and thereupon the clerk must enter judgment accordingly. If notice of acceptance
be not thus given, the offer cannot e given in evidence upon the trial; but, if the
plaintiff fail to obtain a more favorable judgment, he cannot recover costs from
the time of the offer, but must pay costs from that time.
N.Y. Civ. PeAt. Acr § 177 (Cahill 1937).
These states also had statutes simila to the current Federal Rule 54(d); they dif-
fered from the Federal Rule only in that recovery of costs was mandatory for the prevail:.
ing party. See, e.g., 2 MnN. STAT. §§ 9471-73 (Mason 1927); 4 MoNT. Rzv. CODE ANN. §§
9787-88 (1935); and N.Y. CIm. PPac. AcT §§ 1470-75 (Thompson 1939).
25. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Bowden, 89 A. 528 (N.J. Ch. 1914), cited with approval
in Crutcher v. Joyce, 146 F.2d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1945).
1982]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:331
fer of settlement and then recovers no more than the offer. 6
For the Rule to be applied by the courts, the offer of judg-
ment must be timely,27 unconditional," definite, 9 and inclusive
of costs then accrued. 80 If the offeree rejected an offer which met
these prerequisities and if the judgment was less favorable than
the offer,81 the operation of Rule 68 was mandatory.3 2
26. The court in McCloskey v. Bowden, 89 A. 528 (N.J. ch. 1914), explained the rule
as follows:
The rule works e conoerso, and, as the complainant may recover costs against the
defendant who has been warned to do his duty before suit brought, so a complain-
ant who has received a bona fide offer of a proper settlement before bringing suit,
but who brings suit more or less vexatiously, will not, in a court of conscience,
where the matter is discretionary, be allowed either costs or counsel fee against a
defendant who is adjudged to pay practically the sum which, before the bringing
of the suit, he had accounted for and offered to pay.
Id. at 529.
27. The offer must be made at least ten days before trial begins. See Cover v. Chi-
cago Eye Shield Co., 136 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 749 (1943) (con-
struing "before the trial begins"); Staffend v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 218
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (construing "At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins").
28. See 7 J. MooRE, Moons's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 1 68.04 (2d ed. 1980). See, e.g.,
Pinckney v. Childs, 20 N.Y. Super. (Bosworth 7) 660 (1860). In this case the defendant
made an offer whereby payment was conditioned on default of notes which plaintiff ac-
cepted as payment for the offer. The Court stated,
[i]n this case the offer was made expressly subject to the provisions of another
instrument or agreement, and dependent upon the question whether or not a de-
fault had been made in the payment of certain promissory notes other than those
mentioned in the complaint; matters which could only be determined by testi-
mony, by judicial action, which the clerk, a mere ministerial officer, could not
take. The judgment is therefore not irregular only, but void, and should be
vacated.
Id. at 663-64. See also Report of the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, No. 80-94, N.Y.L.J. at 2, col. 2. This
Committee determined that settlement offers conditioned on the waiver of statutory fees
are "unethical in actions arising under civil rights and civil liberties statutes." Id.
29. See Tansey v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949).
The court noted "defendant's offer of judgment does not specify a definite sum to be
entered as judgment which plaintiff can either accept or reject and therefore the offer
will not prevent consideration by the court of plaintiffs costs hereinafter incurred." Id.
at 459.
30. See Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978). The court stated, "Rule
68 requires that an offer of judgment include payment of costs then accrued. In civil
rights actions attorney's fees can constitute part of the costs." Id. at 1260.
31. The Supreme Court has held in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 351,
that "judgment not more favorable than the offer" means that there must be some form
of positive recovery by the offeree. Id. Previously courts had dealt with an offer of judg-
ment even if the offeree lost. See, e.g., Dual v. Cleland, 79 F.R.D. 696 (D.D.C. 1978).
32. See Dual v. Cleland, 79 F.R.D. 696 (D.D.C. 1978); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/7
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Recently one court has been more willing to allow the oper-
ation of Rule 68 to be discretionary. For example, strong public
policy favors a less strict application of the Rule in the context
of racial discrimination. An element of discretion was introduced
in Gay v. Waiter's and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No.
30.33 The court in Gay allowed the award of costs to be in the
discretion of the judge in a class action suit where racial discrim-
ination was alleged, partly because "strong Congressional policy
favors the availability of federal remedies for employment dis-
crimination.""M This element of discretion had been noted in the
lower court decision of August which read a reasonableness re-
quirement into the Rule.35
I. Decision of the Court
A. Majority
The Court's analysis in August turned on what it considered
to be the threshold question: "[W]hether Rule 68 has any appli-
cation to a case in which judgment is entered against the plain-
tiff-offeree and in favor of the defendant-offeror." 6 Writing for
the majority, 7 Justice Stevens concluded that the Rule was not
applicable since the judgment was in favor of the defendant.u
Plastic Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607, 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
33. 86 FRD. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1980). In Gay, the issue was whether a class representa-
tive, alleging racial discrimination, should be asked to make a decision to accept or reject
the offer required by Rule 68. The court held that a class representative should not be
required to make such a decision since it involved an "inherent conflict of interest." Id.
at 503. This conflict arose because the class representative was forced to weigh his best
interests against the best interests of the class; yet it is his duty to protect the interests
of the class.
34. Id. at 506. Since Gay involved a non-settling offeree who obtained a take noth-
ing judgment, it is now implicitly overruled by the August decision. According to August,
Rule 68 would not come into operation in such a case. Thus, there is no need to look to
public policy to justify a departure from the mandatory language of the rule.
35. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d at 702.
36. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 350.
37. Id. at 347. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun delivered the majority opinion. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Jus-
tice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stew-
art joined.
38. The Court stated:
[I]f we limit our analysis to the text of the rule itself, it is clear that it applies
only to offers made by the defendant and only to judgments obtained by the
plaintiff. It therefore is simply inapplicable to this case because it was the defen-
1982]
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Thus, since Ms. August lost at trial, costs could not be imposed
upon her under Rule 68.
The Court reached its decision through a three-sided ap-
proach to the problem. It examined first the plain language of
the Rule; then the purpose of the Rule; and finally its history.
The Court stated that the plain meaning of the language of the
Rule was that it was meant to apply only to situations where the
plaintiff obtained a favorable judgment. "Because the rule obvi-
ously contemplates that a 'judgment taken' against a defendant
is one favorable to the plaintiff, it follows that a judgment 'ob-
tained' by the plaintiff is also a favorable one." 9 The Rule could
not, therefore, apply to Ms. August's situation since as a losing
plaintiff-offeree she had not obtained a judgment "more
favorable than the offer. ,,40
Next the Court considered the purpose behind the Rule, to
encourage settlement of claims. According to this Court the Rule
should only be applied to situations where it would act as an
incentive to settle; for example, it would be appropriate for
those plaintiffs whose recovery is probable, but the amount is
uncertain."1 Additionally, because of the traditional method of
assessing costs to the victorious party, there would be little prac-
tical need to apply the Rule to situations where a nonsettling
plaintiff loses.
Because costs are usually assessed against the losing party, liabil-
ity for costs is a normal incident of defeat. Therefore, a nonset-
tling plaintiff does not run the risk of suffering additional bur-
dens that do not ordinarily attend a defeat and Rule 68 would
provide little, if any, additional incentive if it were applied when
the plaintiff loses.42
The Court noted that while this was the usual method of award-
ing costs, the district judge retained his discretion under Rule
54(d) to award costs to any party regardless of the outcome of
the suit.48
dant that obtained the judgment
Id. at 352.
39. Id. at 351.
40. FeD. R Civ. P. 68.
41. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 352.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See supra note 12.
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Justice Stevens rejected, however, the defendant's argument
that Rule 68 encourages settlement in all cases by depriving the
trial judge of his discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d),
stating that such a thesis would require a schizophrenic reading
of the Rules.
Thus any defendant, by performing the meaningless act of mak-
ing a nominal settlement offer, could eliminate the trial judge's
discretion under Rule 54(d). We cannot reasonably conclude that
the drafters of the Federal Rules intended on the one hand af-
firmatively to grant the district judge discretion to deny costs to
the prevailing party under Rule 54(d) and then on the other hand
to give defendants - and only defendants - the power to take away
that discretion by performing a token act."
The Court continued by saying that Rule 68 was not slanted in
favor of defendants, but was "evenhanded in its operation."'4
Thus the Court declined to follow the lower court which had
read a reasonableness requirement into the Rule in order to
frustrate defendants' ability to control the discretion of district
judges. The Supreme Court stated that "a literal interpretation
totally avoids the problem of sham offers, because such an offer
"146will serve no purpose ....
Next the Court looked at the history of the Rule, noting
that it was an outgrowth of the equitable practice of denying
costs to a plaintiff "when he sues vexatiously after refusing an
offer of settlement.'" 47 The Court compared Rule 68 to similar
state statutes on which Rule 68 was modeled,'8 indicating that
the purpose of these statutes and Rule 68 was to "penalize pre-
vailing plaintiffs who had rejected reasonable settlement offers
without good cause.' 9 Finally, the Court noted that defense
lawyers had not yet developed the practice of misusing Rule 68
to their advantage. Nominal settlement offers are not a wide-
44. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 353 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 354.
46. Id. at 355.
47. Id. at 356, quoting C. WRiGHT & A. Mnwt, FEEAL PRACmcr. mD PROCEDuRE 1
3001 at 56 (1973) (emphasis added).
48. These state statutes were: 2 MhiN. STAT. § 9323 (Mason 1927); 4 MONT. REv.
CODE ANN. § 9770 (1935); N.Y. Civ. PR&c. AcT § 177 (Cahill 1937). See supra note 24 for
the text of these state statutes.
49. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 358.
1982]
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spread means by defendants to avoid costs. This is evidence, the
Court reasoned, that the Rule has been read by practitioners
consistently with its plain language.50
B. Concurrence
Justice Powell disagreed with the majority's reasoning but
agreed with the result. He stated that Rule 68 did not apply be-
cause of the failure to make a proper offer 5 1 not because of the
failure to meet the threshold requirement set out by the
majority.5 2
Justice Powell believed that the offer should have included
reaonable attorneys' fees accrued to the date of the offer.53 Ac-
cording to Justice Powell the offer should have consisted of two
parts: the first proposing specific substantive relief, either mone-
tary or injunctive; the second consisting of a cost provision, in-
cluding attorneys' fees." The award of attorneys' fees in Title
VII is within the court's discretion if the offer is accepted.55 In a
Title VII suit, the court, not bound by the attorney's bill, looks
at two factors: "the time expended and a reasonable hourly rate
for that time."56 Under this standard the offer of judgment in
August could not have included attorneys' fees, and was thus
not a proper offer. 7
50. Id. at 360 (footnote omitted).
51. "I do not think that the terms of the offer made in this case constituted a proper
offer of judgment within the scope of Rule 68." Id. at 362 (Powell, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 350. See supra text accompanying note 36.
53. Under Title VII a prevailing plaintiff will recover reasonable attorneys' fees as
part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.5(k) (1976). See Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,416-17 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
401-02 (1968). As Justice Powell stated:
A Rule 68 offer of judgment is a proposal of settlement that, by definition, stipu-
lates that the plaintiff shall be treated as the prevailing party. It follows, there-
fore, that the "costs" component of a Rule 68 offer of judgment in a Title VII case
must include reasonable attorneys' fees accrued to the date of the offer. Scherifl v.
Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (Colo. 1978) (offer of $10, inclusive of costs, inter--
eat, and attorneys' fees was "fatally defective because it excludes attorneys' fees
then accrued").
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 363.
54. Id. at 365 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Id. (footnote omitted).
57. .Id.
[Vol. 2:331
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C. Dissent
Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's reasoning
and conclusion. Initially, he argued that the Court did not even
address the question that was certified.58 He then attacked the
Court's interpretation of Rule 68, finding that the offeree, even
though losing on the merits, did obtain a judgment.'9 He noted
that the majority's construction of the Rule so as not to include
a take-nothing judgment within the term "judgment," virtually
cut it adrift from the remaining related portions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 and was inconsistent with the Rule's
history of including judgments against a party.61 The majority's
view was further criticized for creating the effect of putting a
nonsettling plaintiff who loses in a better position than a plain-
tiff who obtains a judgment smaller than the offer; Justice Rehn-
quist felt that this result was not intended by the Rules.62
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the majority's analogy to
similar state statutes should not be applied to the Federal Rules,
for in these states the statute governing the recovery of costs by
prevailing defendants was mandatory,5 unlike Rule 54(d), and
thus presented a different pattern of the award of court costs
than under federal practice." The state statutes similar to Rules
58. The question certified to the Court was "[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred in
nullifying a clear and unambiguous mandatory imposition of costs under Rule 68?" Id. at
3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The question addressed by the majority, however, was
"whether the words 'judgment obtained by the offeree' as used in that Rule should be
construed to encompass a judgment against the offeree as well as a judgment in favor of
the offeree." Id. at 366 (emphasis in original).
59. "The term 'judgment' is defined in Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure to mean 'a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.' Unquestionably,
respondent 'obtained' an 'order from which an appeal lies' when the District Court en-
tered its judgment in this case." Id. at 370-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 379-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., 4 MoNT. Rav. CoDz ANN. §§ 9787-88 (1935); 2 MwN. STAT. § 9471 (Ma-
son 1927); and N.Y. Civ. PaC. AcT §§ 1470-75 (Thompson 1939).
64. Justice Rehnqulst reasoned:
As a result, the state cases cited by the Court do not address the situation in
which a defendant has prevailed on the merits because in that situation the shift-
ing of costs was mandatory under state law. It is, therefore, difficult for me to
umiderstand how it can be argued that Congress, seeking to pattern Rule 68 after
the procedure used in these three states, could possibly have intended to immu-
nize plaintiffs from the operation of the Rule and the concomitant costs it imposes
11
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54(d) and 68 both require a plaintiff who wins, but for an
amount less than the offer, to pay the losing defendant's costs.
But because of the state statutes' mandatory practice and the
Federal Rules' discretionary practice of awarding costs6 5 to the
prevailing party, there is a situation, however, left uncovered by
analogizing the state statutes to the Federal Rules. The defen-
dant in federal court who wins on the merits after having his
offer refused may still have costs awarded to the plaintiff
through the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 54(d).
This is a situation that does not occur under the state statutes.
Thus, according to Justice Rehnquist, because the two situations
are not similar, there is a basic flaw in the logic of the analogy,
and the court should not have based its decision in part on this
argument.
The dissent then took exception with Justice Powell's argu-
ment that a proper offer should include a flexible provision for
attorneys' fees as part of the costs. According to Justice Rehn-
quist, the history of Rule 68 shows no intention to depart from
the common meaning of costs, which did not include attorneys'
fees." He argued that if Congress wanted attorneys' fees recov-
ered, it would have stated so specifically in the Rule. 7 Because
some statutes include attorneys' fees as costs while others do
not, he was also concerned that if the components of costs were
determined by the terms of the statute underlying the law suit,
there would be inconsistent results."
simply because they lost their cases on the merits.
Id. at 373-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. See Fro. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
66. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 377 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Justice Rehnquist stated, "[t]he legislative history of Rule 68 indicates no intent
to deviate from the common meaning of costs and this conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that when the authors of the rules intended that attorneys' fees be recovered, such fees
were specifically mentioned." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Federal Rule 37
which allows "reasonable expenses .... including attorneys' fees, as a sanction for dis-
covery abuses." Fzn. R. Cv. P. 37.
68. Conceivably a plaintiff could bring an action under a statute including attorneys'
fees as costs and obtain a judgment less than the rejected offer, and then be subjected to
costs including attorneys' fees. Another plaintiff could bring an action under a statute
which did not include attorneys' fees and receive a judgment less than the rejected offer,
but only have to pay the costs which did not include attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Roadway
Express v. Piper U.S., 447 U.S. 752 S. (1980), where the Court held that actions under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 do not include attorneys' fees.
[Vol. 2:331
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/7
FEDERAL RULE 68
Finally, Justice Rehnquist was concerned that including at-
torneys' fees in costs could lead to a problem in cases brought
under Title VII 9 Title VII permits a winning defendant to be
awarded costs only if the plaintiff's case was frivolous.70 The ma-
jority's interpretation of Rule 68 however, requires that the de-
fendant be awarded costs if the judgment obtained by the plain-
tiff is less favorable than the offer. The dissent was concerned
that "this could seriously undermine the purposes behind the
attorney's fees provisions of the Civil Rights Act .
IV. Analysis
The majority found that the threshold question in a Rule 68
case is whether a judgment entered against the plaintiff and in
favor of the defendant was less favorable than the offer, thereby
falling within the ambit of Rule 68. ' But a logical analysis first
requires a determination of whether there was a good faith of-
fer75 and whether it was refused. Thus, the analysis should be a
three step approach:
(1) Was there a good faith offer?
(2) Was this offer refused?
(3) Was the judgment obtained less favorable than the offer?
Before reaching the question which the majority considers
"threshold", there are thus two preliminary questions which
must be answered.
The second question is one of fact: either the offer was ac-
cepted or refused. Within this apparently simple question lie
more complex issues. For example, was an offer "accepted" if
the offeree only agreed to one part of a multi-part offer? What
happens if a counter-offer made by the original offeree is never
accepted by the offeror? Does the counter-offer constitute some
form of acceptance or is the offeror now placed in a position sim-
ilar to the offeree in that he will be liable for costs incurred after
69. See supra note 5 for text of applicable statute.
70. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See supra note 53.
71. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 378 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 350.
73. See August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d at 702.
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the date of the counter-offer? A situation can easily be imagined
where all of these questions would have to be addressed- A de-
fendant-offeror makes an offer which consists of monetary and
injunctive relief; the plaintiff-offeree accepts the monetary por-
tion but refuses the injunctive part and makes a counter-offer
that it will settle if some additional injunctive relief is given.
This is a situation which may come before a court, but the Su-
preme Court's decision in August gives no guidance on how that
court should deal with this problem.
The first question requires a determination of whether an
offer was reasonable or a sham. If the offer was so clearly frivo-
lous that the plaintiff had to reject it, the Rule should not be
triggered at all. Applying the Rule in such a case would be con-
trary to its purpose of encouraging the settlement of litigation."4
A sham offer would not encourage settlement; in fact it might
discourage settlement by antagonizing the offeree. 5
The Court in August, by focusing on the third question, has
sidestepped the fundamental issue. The third question should
not be considered until the other two questions have been
answered.
In addition to its misplaced focus, the majority's reasoning
has several flaws. The first flaw is its conclusory attitude. Justice
Stevens stated with finality that the Rule is not intended to ap-
ply to situations in which the plaintiff loses. In reaching this
conclusion he merely declared that "because the rule obviously
contemplates that a 'judgment taken' against a defendant is one
favorable to the plaintiff, it follows that a judgment 'obtained'
by the plaintiff is also a favorable one."7 The Rule does not set
out this maxim, however, and the statement does not automati-
cally flow from it.
The Court also stressed that the Rule does not impose addi-
tional burdens on the non-settling unsuccessful plaintiff, since
costs are usually assessed against the losing party anyway.7 This
74. Id.
75. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "[u]nrealistic use of the rule
would not encourage settlements, avoid protracted litigation or relieve courts of vexa-
tious litigation." Id. at 701.
76. Delth Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 351. No cases or other authority are
cited by the Supreme Court in support of this statement
77. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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argument ignores the purpose of Rule 68, to encourage settle-
ments by removing the Judge's Rule 54(d) discretion in award-
ing costs.7 8 Without Rule 68, the losing plaintiff might still be
able to avoid paying costs because the judge, in his discretion,
may determine which party will be awarded costs.
A more important question involves the burden placed on a
non-settling plaintiff who wins a partial recovery or a recovery
less than the offer of judgment. According to the majority's deci-
sion, the plaintiff is subject to the Rule upon winning anything
and is therefore placed in a worse position than a plaintiff who
loses and is not subject to the Rule. This is an unfair result,
since the mere fact of winning some relief shows merit in the
offeree's claim; that offeree is penalized, however, by having to
pay the offeror's costs from the time of the offer. An offeree who
loses completely pays nothing. In the latter situation an infer-
ence may be drawn that the offeree's claim was without merit. In
light of the Rule's purpose to encourage settlement of suits79 it
seems fairer to apply it to an offeree bringing a frivolous suit,
rather than to an offeree who shows some merit by winning a
partial judgment.
The Court also posits that the Rule is evenhanded in its op-
eration. 0 "We can conceive of no reason why defendants-and
not plaintiffs - should be given an entirely risk-free method of
denying trial judges the discretion that Rule 54(d) confers re-
gardless of the outcome of the litigation."81 But this is exactly
what the operation of the Rule is intended to do. It is the defen-
dant who usually makes the offer and thus the Rule, on its face,
can only work to the defendant's advantage. The defendant risks
nothing by making the offer; instead, the defendant stops the
running of costs from the time of the offer thereby providing
78. Rule 54 was promulgated in 1937, enacted the next year, and since amended
several times. Before Rule 54, the prevailing party in an action at law would recover
costs as of right unless a statute provided otherwise. In equity costs were awarded to
either party in the court's discretion. See 6 J. MooRs, Moona's FEDRAL PRAcTIcE 1
54.70[3] (2d ed. 1980) (citing In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Newton v. Consoli-
dated Gas Co. of New York, 265 U.S. 78 (1924)). For text of Rule 54(d) see supra note
12. See supra discussion in text and accompanying notes 21-34.
79. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
80. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 354.
81. Id. at 354-55 (footnote omitted).
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himself with a form of insurance.8 ,
The Court argued that a sham or token offer has no practi-
cal consequence in a Rule 68 situation.83 The argument was that
a defendant would not gain anything by making a token offer,"
presumably because the plaintiff would be more likely to obtain
a judgment greater than a token offer yet not greater than a rea-
sonable offer. But this overlooks defendants' practices in making
offers. Usually a defendant will make the lowest feasible offer,
hoping that it will be accepted but secure in the knowledge that,
if rejected, he has still prevented costs from being assessed
against him. 5 While professing that reasonableness is not an is-
sue, the Court in the same paragraph set up a basis for inquiring
into the reasonableness of an offer:
But it is hardly fair or even-handed to make the plaintiff's rejec-
tion of an utterly frivolous settlement offer a watershed event
that transforms a prevailing defendant's right to costs in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge into an absolute right to recover the
costs incurred after the offer was made.8
If the Supreme Court truly considered reasonableness a factor,8"
then the decision of the court of appeals was correct because it
reached its decision using reasonableness as one of its stan-
dards 8 The Supreme Court, while holding that reasonableness
82. See id. at 353.
83. Id. at 352.
84. Id.
85. In a footnote the Court expands this argument. "Moreover, because the defen-
dant's settlement offer is admissible at a proceeding to determine costs, a defendant
could use a reasonable settlement offer as a means of influencing the judge's discretion to
award costs under Rule 54(d)." Id. at 356 n. 16.
It is true that a defendant will use the rejected settlement offer to establish the
burden of costs, but that does not mean that in making the offer the defendant will
tailor it to this future interest.
86. Id. (footnote omitted).
87. As the Court stated: "If a plaintiff chooses to reject a reasonable offer, then it is
fair that he not be allowed to shift the cost of continuing the litigation to the defendant
in the event that his gamble produces an award that is less than or equal to the amount
offered." Id. The Court again introduced a reasonableness standard when referring to the
three state statutes which the Court compared with Rule 68: "Therefore the only pur-
pose served by these state offer of judgment rules was to penalize prevailing plaintiffs
who had rejected reasonable settlement offers without good cause." Id. at 358 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
88. The court of appeals concluded by holding
In a Title VII case the trial judge may exercise his discretion and allow costs
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is not a proper consideration, seemed to permit judges to use
their discretion in assessing reasonableness. Furthermore, the
methods of assessing reasonableness are not described, possibly
leading to great discrepancy between lower courts.
The Court's final argument was that since lawyers have not
developed the habit of seeking costs under Rule 68 by making
sham offers, the Rule has been interpreted as not including
sham offers.8 9 This argument fails because it ignores the history
of the Rule, which is that it has been applied mandatorily by the
courts until recently when a reasonableness requirement was
read into it. s0 Lawyers were safe in making any offer, even a
sham one, knowing that the issue of reasonableness of the offer
would not be litigated. There may have been many instances of
sham offers being made but they would not reach the court since
the outcome was already predetermined: The Rule must be ap-
plied if the pre-conditions were met regardless of the reasona-
bleness of the offer.
The dispute between Justices Powell and Rehnquist cen-
tered on the definition of costs. Justice Powell believed that
costs should include attorneys' fees in a Title VII case because
that statute so allows. As Justice Rehnquist observed, however,
linking the award of attorneys' fees to the underlying statute
would lead to inconsistent results in each case.91
A situation not considered by the Court is that of mixed
relief, in which a plaintiff asks for monetary and injunctive re-
lief, but is offered only money and receives an injunction in his
favor. The problem involves balancing two different types of re-
lief. The court must set some monetary value to the injunction
in order to compare it with the pecuniary offer.92 This is a diffi-
under Rule 68 when, viewed as of the time of the offer along with consideration of
the final outcome of the case, the offer can be seen to have been made in good
faith and to have had some reasonable relationship in amount to the issues, liti-
gation and expenses anticipated and involved in the case.
August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d at 702 (emphasis added).
89. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. at 360.
90. See, e.g., Hones v. Crescent Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. La.
1975).
91. See generally Malvern, The "Offer of Judgment Rule" in Employment Discrim-
ination Actions: A Fundamental Incompatibility, 10 GOLDEN GATz L. REv. 963, 973-78
(1980).
92. See id. at 969-72.
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cult and unrealistic task involving too many subjective variables,
and, by its very nature, requiring much judicial time. For exam-
ple, consider this situation: Ms. August seeks not only reinstate-
ment and back pay98 but also damages; Delta Airlines makes an
offer of $50,000 in damages but no equitable relief; Ms. August
rejects this offer and continues with the suit; her final recovery
is for $12,000 in back pay and reinstatement to her job but no
damages. Contrary to Rule 68's purpose of facilitating the
speedy settlement of suits, this process of determining whether
the judgment obtained at trial is less favorable than the offer is
necessarily lengthy. Thus, in a mixed relief case, the August de-
cision frustrates the Rule's purpose.
V. Conclusion
As a result of August, the Supreme Court has turned Rule
68 into a potentially unjust Rule. The Rule works to the advan-
tage of nonsettling offerees who are most in need of chastise-
ment; those whose suits were so lacking in merit that they ob-
tained no judgment at all. At the same time nonsettling offerees
whose case had some merit are penalized solely for winning an
amount less than the offer. Moreover, the Court failed to ad-
dress the problems inherent in a mixed relief claim.
The Rule was intended to "encourage settlement and avoid
protracted litigation"9' in all cases. It was not supposed to be
unfair in its operation by singling out one type of offeree for spe-
cial treatment over another. Nevertheless, the Court has en-
couraged only the settlement of colorable claims while encourag-
ing the litigation of frivolous claims.
Margaret M. Lyons
93. See supra text accompanying note 6.
94. 5 F.R.D. 433, 483 note (1946). See supra note 19 and accompanying text
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